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SHOOTING FROM THE HIP: MISSOURI’S NEW APPROACH TO 
DEFENSE OF HABITATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the 94th General Assembly of the State of Missouri enacted 
Senate Bills 62 and 41, expanding the justified use of deadly force in defense 
of habitation.1  While the defense of habitation could only be used in limited 
circumstances both at common law and when originally encoded into statute,2 
deadly force could now be used against anyone unlawfully entering or 
remaining upon an occupant’s premises, seemingly regardless of the 
trespasser’s intent to commit a crime therein.3  Merging the defense of 
habitation with the self-defense statute, the Missouri legislature demolished the 
defense of habitation’s long-standing distinction from self defense by 
conflating the harms to be protected against4 and extending defense of 
habitation even after entry has been achieved.5 
In 2010, the Missouri House of Representatives passed a further and even 
more unusual extension to the defense of habitation statute.6  Effective August 
28, 2010, a person can use deadly force against those unlawfully entering or 
remaining not only in his residence, car, or dwelling, including any building, 
inhabitable structure, tent, or conveyance which is temporary, permanent, 
mobile or immobile, as provided already,7 but also on his private property.8  
 
 1. S.B. 62 & 41, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007). 
 2. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.036.2(2) (Supp. 1977) (allowing deadly force to be used in 
defense of habitation only when the homeowner has reasonable belief that the intruder intends to 
commit arson or burglary). 
 3. “A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the circumstances 
specified in subsection 1 of this section unless: . . . (2) Such force is used against a person who 
unlawfully enters, remains after unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter a dwelling, 
residence, or vehicle lawfully occupied by such person.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2(2) (Supp. 
2007). 
 4. See, e.g., State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that self 
defense protects against danger of personal harm while defense of habitation protects against 
danger of entry). 
 5. See State v. Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d 681, 692 (Mo. 1962) (finding the doctrine of 
defense of habitation inapplicable after the trespasser has crossed the threshold into the house). 
 6. H.B. 1692, 1209, 1405, 1499, 1535 & 1811, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2010). 
 7. S.B. 62 & 41, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007). 
 8. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.011(6) (Supp. 2010); H.B. 1692, 1209, 1405, 1499, 1535 & 1811, 
95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010). 
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The House Bill, thus, effectively extends the occupant’s justified use of deadly 
force from his house or car to his property’s limits.9 
While political rhetoric asserting a homeowner’s right to defend his turf, 
stand his ground and protect his castle made for an easy passage of these 
bills,10 there remain some ambiguities and possible inconsistencies in the 
statute, creating potential confusion in applying the new law.  This Comment 
will trace the history of defense of habitation through the common law to the 
case law and statutory amendments currently in place in Missouri.  Based on 
analysis of the current statutes recently enacted, the Comment will also make 
recommendations for possible revisions to make the statues and application of 
defense of habitation less ambiguous. 
I.  A HISTORY OF DEFENSE OF HABITATION 
Because the common law placed greater value on the preservation of 
human life than on any property, the laws of defense of property and defense 
of habitation did not allow deadly force to be used unless there was some 
additional threat other than trespass or larceny.11  At common law, therefore, 
 
 9. See H.B. 1692, 1209, 1405, 1499, 1535 & 1811, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2010); S.B. 62 & 41, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007).  As will be discussed later, 
the 2010 House Bill also introduced a rebuttable presumption that the defender’s use of deadly 
force was reasonable and necessary.  However, that presumption only applies to the dwelling, 
residence, or vehicle, not to the 2010 extension to private property.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 10. See Andrew Denney, Omnibus bill in Missouri would expand Castle Doctrine, MO. 
LAW. WKLY., Apr. 18, 2010, at 3 (“The House approved the bill 130–21 in late March.”); House 
Rollcall on 03/16/2010, MO. DIGITAL NEWS, http://www.mdn.org/2010/FORMS/ 
VIEWVOTE.HTM?ne_year=2010&ne_vote=979 (last visited Mar. 14, 2012) (vote in House was 
130 to 22); Missouri Governor Signs Important Pro-Gun Measures into Law, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N 
INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 14, 2010), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-
legislation/2010/7/missouri-governor-signs-important-pro-g.aspx?s=pro-gun%20measures&st= 
10489&ps= (characterizing the bill as “expand[ing] Missouri’s ‘Castle Doctrine’ protections to 
any property boundaries one leases or owns[,]” which it considered “a victory and important 
advancement for gun rights in Missouri”); Missouri Governor Signs Castle Doctrine, Hunting 
Preservation Bills Into Law, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 6, 2007), 
http://www.nraila.org/hunting/issues-and-alerts/2007/missouri-governor-signs-castle-doctrine. 
aspx?s=castle&st=10489&ps= (describing the Senate Bill as one of the “NRA-ILA’s top 
legislative priorities”); Vote on Missouri’s Castle Doctrine Legislation Could Happen At Any 
Time!, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (May 2, 2007), http://www.nr 
aila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2007/5/vote-on-missouri%E2%80%99s-castle-doctrine-legi. 
aspx?s=castle%20doctrine%20legislation&st=10489&ps= (reporting that the House passed the 
bill by a vote of 154 to 6). 
 11. WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 
291 (Herschel B. Lazell ed., 2d ed. 1905) (“While a person cannot take another’s life or inflict 
great bodily harm in defense of his property, except when it is necessary to prevent a felony 
attempted by violence or surprise, he may use any force short of this that may reasonably seem to 
be necessary in defense of his property, real or personal.”) (emphasis added). 
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defense of property was never sufficient in and of itself to justify the use of 
deadly force12 because “the preservation of life has such moral and ethical 
standing in our culture and society, that the deliberate sacrifice of life merely 
for the protection of property ought not to be sanctioned by law.”13  Defense of 
habitation, however, was and is different than mere defense of property 
because of the idea that “it is sacred for the protection of [a] person and of his 
family.”14  Nevertheless, even at common law, the doctrine of defense of 
habitation “[did] not justify a homicide merely to prevent a trespass upon the 
habitation, when it is evident that there is no intention to commit a felony or to 
inflict great bodily harm upon an inmate.”15  Rather, an inhabitant had to have 
a “bona fide and reasonable belief that the assailant intends a felony or great 
bodily harm to an inmate” in order for his use of deadly force to be justified.16  
So, while one claiming defense of habitation could use deadly force at 
common law, such force was justifiable only if the inhabitant could show that 
it was used to protect against a violent or forcible felony, not a mere trespass.17 
The common law maxim that a man’s home is his castle18 is often invoked 
today to justify the use of deadly force in defense of habitation.  However, 
much of the rationale for allowance of such force at common law is no longer 
pertinent.  For one, all common law felonies were punishable by either life 
imprisonment or death.19  Thus, use of deadly force appeared more 
proportionate against a felony when such felony would be punishable by death 
 
 12. Comment, The Use of Deadly Force in the Protection of Property Under the Model 
Penal Code, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1214 (1959) (“The common-law rule clearly allows one in 
lawful possession of any property to use reasonable but not deadly force to protect that property, 
even when the taking or trespass is attempted under a claim of right.”). 
 13. Continuation of Discussion of the Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 8), 35 A.L.I. 
PROC. 274, 285–86 (1958). 
 14. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 11, at 410 n.527 (quoting State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 
308 (1873)). 
 15. Id. at 410; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *180 (“If any person . . . 
attempts to break open a house in the night time, (which extends also to an attempt to burn it,) and 
shall be killed in such attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged.  This reaches not to 
any crime unaccompanied with force, . . . or to the breaking open of any house in the day time, 
unless it carries with it an attempt of robbery also.”); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAW 
OF ENGLAND *220 (“If it be found by verdict, that the party (indicted or appealed for the death of 
A) A attempted to have murdered or robbed him . . . in his mansion or dwelling house; or for the 
killing of him which attempteth burglary to break his dwelling house in the night; the judgment 
upon such a verdict shall be, that he shall be acquited [sic] of the death of such a person.”). 
 16. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 11, at 410. 
 17. “[D]eadly force was allowed only if a forcible entry was made under such circumstances 
as to create a reasonable apprehension that it was the design of the assailant to commit a violent 
or forcible felony or to inflict serious bodily harm on the occupants.”  Comment, supra note 12, at 
1216. 
 18. State v. Taylor, 44 S.W. 785, 788 (Mo. 1898). 
 19. Comment, supra note 12, at 1217. 
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and when felonies were far more limited in number.  Another rationale for the 
use of deadly force in defense of habitation at common law was that “law 
enforcement was largely in the hands of private citizens” at that time.20  In 
modern society, with more numerous statutory felonies, less extreme 
punishment of such felonies, and greater access to law enforcement personnel, 
these justifications are less applicable. 
Castle doctrine, not to be confused with defense of habitation, provided an 
exception to the duty to retreat when a person is in his own home.21  At 
common law, a person was required to “retreat to the wall” before he could 
claim that the deadly force used against another was necessary.22  Castle 
doctrine removed that retreat prerequisite to using deadly force if the person 
was at home because the law believed that retreating to the home was, 
essentially, retreating to the wall.23  Of course, while retreat was not required, 
all other self-defense requirements remained.24 
II.  MISSOURI’S CASE LAW ON DEFENSE OF HABITATION PRE-2007 
One of Missouri’s oldest cases affirming the common law understanding 
of defense of habitation is State v. Taylor.25  In Taylor, the defendant and the 
victim got into a fist-fight in the defendant’s home.26  The defendant ejected 
the victim from his house, but the victim soon returned.27  When a friend told 
him that the victim was outside his house, the defendant shouted, “I will kill 
the first one that comes in” and thereafter shot the victim when he entered.28  
At trial, the defendant asserted that he had a right to defend his dwelling 
against unlawful trespass.29  Although the court recognized that the defendant 
had no duty to retreat in his own home,30 it did not think that, just because the 
shooting occurred in the defendant’s house, his action was justifiable under the 
maxim that “every man’s house is his castle.”31  In conformity with the 
 
 20. Id. at 1221. 
 21. Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in 
Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 7, 9. 
 25. State v. Taylor, 44 S.W. 785 (Mo. 1898). 
 26. Id. at 786. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Taylor, 44 S.W. at 789. 
 31. Id. (“When a person is attacked in his own house, he need retreat no further. . . .  In this 
sense, and in this sense alone, are we to understand the maxim that ‘every man’s house is his 
castle.’  An assailed person . . . is not entitled . . . to kill his assailant . . . .”) 
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common law, the court rejected the defendant’s argument,32 insisting that he 
was “not entitled . . . to kill his assailant unless he honestly and nonnegligently 
believe[d] that he [was] in danger of his life from the assault.”33  Basically, the 
court applied the normal requirement for using deadly force in self defense—
that the defendant have a reasonable belief in an imminent threat of serious 
physical injury—and refused to make an exception merely because of the 
location of the crime at the defendant’s house.34  The court summed up a 
person’s rights in using deadly force to defend his home, which essentially 
remained unchanged until 2007, by saying that a person “has no right to kill 
unless it becomes necessary to prevent a felonious destruction of his property 
or the commission of a felony therein, or to defend himself against a felonious 
assault against his life or person.”35 
In State v. Brookshire, a much later case, the court further clarified a 
homeowner’s rights in defense of habitation by explaining that the defense of 
habitation is not applicable if the trespasser crosses the threshold of the 
house.36  The victim in this case was threatening the defendant outside the 
defendant’s home.37  The court recognized that if force, even deadly force, had 
been used at that point, it may have been justified under defense of habitation 
because he “could reasonably have believed his life was in danger.”38  
However, the defendant did not use any force until after the victim entered the 
house.39  “The barrier had been crossed,”40 and with that crossing, the 
defendant lost the right to claim defense of habitation: “Under the common 
law41 of the defense of habitation defendant had no right to punish deceased for 
the unlawful entry already completed.”42  While the defendant lost the right to 
claim defense of habitation, he retained the right to argue self defense coupled 
 
 32. Id. at 788. (“It is insisted by defendant that at common law one was justifiable in killing 
a mere trespasser upon his dwelling house.  We do not so understand the sages of the law.”) 
 33. Id. at 789. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Taylor, 44 S.W. at 789. 
 36. State v. Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d 681, 692 (Mo. 1962). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. While the court did look to the common law to show that the defendant’s right to claim 
defense of habitation extinguished on the victim’s crossing the threshold, it also explicitly stated 
that “[t]he statutory definition of justifiable homicide, insofar as it pertains to a dwelling house, 
does not include all of the common law defense of habitation.”  Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d at 690.  
In State v. Gardener, 606 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), the court recognized this point 
and further concluded that, although the common law defense of habitation may have included 
“curtilage,” Missouri law did not.  Thus, even though the defendant in Gardener was on her 
driveway, she had a duty to retreat to her “house proper” before she could use deadly force.  Id. 
 42. Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d at 692. 
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with an instruction that he had no duty to retreat.43  So, in addition to Taylor’s 
requirement that deadly force not be used unless the homeowner fears a felony 
will be committed on him or his property,44 Brookshire points out that no force 
can be justified under defense of habitation unless it is used prior to “crossing 
the barrier” of the home.45  Thus, after an intruder enters the house proper, a 
homeowner can only plead self defense, as the defense of habitation only 
applies to actions taken prior to the intruder’s entrance into the home.46 
In State v. Ivicsics, a 1980 case, the Eastern District Court of Appeals 
closely examined the state of defense of habitation in Missouri in finding that 
the defendant should have received such an instruction.47  The defendant in 
Ivicsics was convicted of manslaughter for stabbing his brother, Robert.48  The 
two brothers had been inside the defendant’s trailer when they began arguing 
and fighting.49  The defendant ordered Robert to leave, and when he failed to 
do so, a friend who was also present forcibly pushed him out.50  Robert then 
ran to his car, reached under the seat, and turned to go back to the trailer.51  
The defendant believed that his brother was getting a gun from his car while 
the defendant was retrieving an old army bayonet from his room.52  There was 
some dispute about where the stabbing took place—the state claimed ten to 
fifteen feet from the trailer, but the defendant claimed at the doorway of the 
trailer—but it was clear Robert was returning to continue the fight with the 
defendant.53 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Taylor, 44 S.W. at 789. 
 45. Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d at 692; see also State v. Hashman, 197 S.W.3d 119, 132 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2006) (upholding first degree assault conviction and finding that the defendant was not 
entitled to a defense of premises instruction because at the time he used the deadly force, the 
victim had already entered the house); State v. Hafeli, 715 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) 
(“When attacked in his own house . . . it is [a] question of the law of self-defense and not the law 
of defense of habitation which is involved.”); 
State v. Battle, 625 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the defendant was not 
entitled to an instruction of defense of habitation when police entered his house, responding to 
domestic dispute call, because their entry was not unlawful and they had already entered the 
house when the defendant fired his rifle). 
 46. Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d at 692.  Remember though, that although self defense alone, and 
not defense of habitation, is available to the defendant, the requirement of retreat is not necessary.  
See id. (“[W]hat protective action the occupant may take after the aggressor has effected his entry 
. . . is justifiable only under the usual rules of self-defense . . . except that there is no duty to 
retreat.”). 
 47. State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 48. Id. at 775. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 775. 
 53. Id. 
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At trial, the court gave an instruction on self defense, but failed to also give 
an instruction on defense of habitation, which the defendant claimed he was 
entitled to.54  The court began its analysis comparing self defense and defense 
of habitation to determine whether an instruction on both self defense and 
defense of habitation was necessary, or whether the given instruction 
“adequately submit[ted] the defense of habitation.”55  Because this was a case 
in which deadly force was used, the court considered both defenses in that 
context.56 
At that time, “[s]elf defense grant[ed] a defender the privilege to use 
deadly force in the effort to defend himself against personal harm threatened 
by the unlawful act of another, if the defender has reasonable cause to believe 
that (1) there is immediate danger the threatened harm will occur, (2) the harm 
threatened is death or serious bodily injury and (3) deadly force is necessary to 
overcome the harm as reasonably perceived.”57  In contrast, defense of 
habitation “grants a defender the privilege to use force58 to defend his dwelling 
against an unlawful entry” rather than the danger of personal harm.59  Thus, the 
harm to be avoided—harm against the person for self defense and harm of 
unlawful entry for defense of habitation—was different with the two 
justifications. 
The other significant difference from the normal qualifications to using 
deadly force in self defense is that the defender need not retreat, even if 
feasible, before he uses deadly force when he is in his home.60  However, other 
than having no duty to retreat and focusing on different acts to be prevented, 
that is, harm threatened against the person for self defense versus an unlawful 
entry for defense of habitation, all other elements must still be present: “The 
defense of habitation grants the lawful occupant of a dwelling the privilege to 
use deadly force to prevent an attempted unlawful entry into the dwelling, if 
the occupant had reasonable61 cause to believe that (1) there is immediate 
 
 54. Id. at 776. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 776 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Sanders, 556 S.W.2d 75, 
76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) and State v. Jackson, 522 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)).  The 
current self-defense statute was not codified until 1977 and did not become effective until 1979.  
See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 58. The force justified for mere unlawful entry is only non-lethal, reasonably necessary 
force, not deadly force, which can only be used if the homeowner fears a felony or seriously 
bodily injury from the intruder. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 776–77. 
 59. Id. at 776 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Mo. 
1962)). 
 60. Id. at 777.  This no-duty-to-retreat rule also applies to self defense, though, as long as the 
defender is in his home proper when defending himself. 
 61. See State v. Lumpkin, 850 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (pointing out that the 
defendant’s belief must be objectively reasonable: “It is not sufficient solely that the defendant 
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danger the entry will occur, (2) the entry is being attempted for the purpose of 
killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on the occupant and (3) deadly force is 
necessary62 to prevent the unlawful entry.”63  Thus, in comparing the self-
defense test with that of defense of habitation, the primary difference is that 
with defense of habitation the “protective acts [can] be taken earlier than they 
otherwise would be authorized.”64 
The court in Ivicsics recognized that some other jurisdictions had a broader 
defense of habitation doctrine that allowed the homeowner to use deadly force 
even against a non-deadly personal attack.65  These other jurisdictions justified 
a more expansive defense of habitation relying on the often-used rationale that 
a dwelling is “a place of refuge in which the occupant may expect to be free 
from personal attack even of a non-deadly character.”66  However, the 
Missouri court explicitly rejected adopting such a doctrine, asserting that “our 
courts have consistently refused to extend the privilege of using deadly force to 
prevent an entry attempted for the mere purpose of making a personal assault 
which is neither intended nor likely to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm.”67  
In rejecting this broader doctrine of defense of habitation, the court concluded 
that “defense of habitation is nothing more than accelerated self defense, and 
the difference between the two defenses is a function of time and space.”68 
After clarifying the true distinctions between self defense and defense of 
habitation, the court returned to the question on appeal: whether the defendant 
should have been given an instruction of defense of habitation.69  Despite the 
substantial similarities between the doctrines, the court held that the trial 
court’s failure to give a defense of habitation instruction was prejudicial 
error.70  Although the difference between the two defenses was one of “time 
and space,”71 that difference significantly changed the focus for the jury: in self 
defense, the defendant must wait to use deadly force until the danger of harm 
from personal attack is imminent while defense of habitation requires only 
 
believed in his or her own mind that the other person was attempting to enter the premises to 
commit burglary; the belief must also be objectively reasonable.”). 
 62. See State v. Dulaney, 989 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (suggesting that failure 
to remain in your home and call the police where possible will destroy the necessity element and 
prevent a defense of premises instruction). 
 63. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 777. 
 64. Id. (quoting Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d at 692). 
 65. Id. at 776 (citing Leverette v. State, 122 S.E.2d 745, 746–47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); People 
v. Eatman, 91 N.E.2d 387, 389–90 (Ill. 1950)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 777. 
 68. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 777. 
 69. Id. at 778. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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danger of immediate unlawful entry.72  So, “[a]s long as the evidence shows 
the intruder has not entered the dwelling, an instruction defining the defense of 
habitation must be given so the jury can focus on the immediacy of the danger 
of the entry rather than on the immediacy of the danger of the harm.”73  
Interestingly, the court notes that these two defenses of self defense and 
defense of habitation may merge at the point when “the defender is 
immediately adjacent to the doorway,” and an instruction of either self defense 
or defense of habitation would suffice.74  However, since such a determination 
is “abstract and theoretical,” a court should not be allowed to decide if the 
merger did occur and must give an instruction of both in such a close case.75  
That situation was not present here though; because the defendant’s brother 
had not yet crossed the threshold into his trailer, the defendant was entitled to 
an instruction of defense of habitation.76 
The next major examination of Missouri’s defense of habitation doctrine 
came in 2001 with State v. Johnson, heard by the Western District Court of 
Appeals.77  Johnson addressed the situation that the Ivicsics court mentioned in 
dicta: when the doctrine of self defense and defense of habitation merge at the 
threshold of the defendant’s dwelling.78  The defendant in Johnson lived with 
his wife and two daughters,79 who, on the day of the shooting, were having a 
barbeque on the front porch.80  His daughters had invited friends, Mr. Watkins 
and Mr. Taylor, whom the defendant disapproved of and asked to leave.81  
When, after the defendant’s wife told them they could stay, the two men 
remained, the defendant proceeded to lock all the windows and doors to the 
house, forbidding those inside to open the doors.82  The defendant claimed that 
when he asked the boys to leave, he saw something that looked like a weapon 
stuffed in the back of Taylor’s pants.83  Although the two men left, they 
returned shortly thereafter, at which point the defendant went to his bedroom 
and retrieved a gun.84  The defendant then went onto the porch, showed the 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 778. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  The court notes that the defendant would have been entitled to such an instruction 
even if he failed to request it.  Id. at 776. 
 77. State v. Johnson, 54 S.W.3d 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 78. Id. at 603. 
 79. The defendant also lived with another “occasional resident,” who is irrelevant to this 
analysis.  Id. at 599. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Johnson, 54 S.W.3d at 599–600. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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boys his gun, asked them to leave again, and returned back into his house.85  
When the defendant thought he heard someone trying to open the screen door 
from the porch, he loaded the gun and opened the inside door to find Watkins 
standing in front of the screen door still dividing them.86  Upset upon seeing 
the shotgun, Watkins threatened the defendant and grabbed for the screen 
door.87  The two struggled for the door, and when the defendant heard what he 
thought was the slide chamber of a gun, he fired upon Watkins.88  The jury 
convicted the defendant of second-degree murder.89 
On appeal, Johnson demanded reversal for the trial court’s failure to give a 
defense of habitation instruction.90  Even though it appears the defendant did 
not request the instruction,91 as an instruction on justifiable homicide, defense 
of habitation must be given whether or not requested.92  The defendant met his 
“burden of injecting the issue” by merely presenting facts that would support 
it.93  The State, looking to the dicta set forth in Ivicsics, argued that, although 
failure to give the instruction was error, it was harmless error because the two 
defenses of self defense and defense of habitation were “practically 
identical,”94 especially since the jury was instructed that the defendant had no 
duty to retreat in his use of deadly force in this case.95  Because, the State 
argued, defense of habitation is different from self defense only in that it 
creates no duty to retreat and allows protective acts to be taken earlier, there 
was no prejudice in a situation like the present one where the retreat rule was 
identical and the struggle, occurring at the doorway, effectively merged the 
two doctrines.96  However, the court of appeals rejected this argument: 
[T]he determination of the point in time and space that the two defenses merge 
is an abstract and theoretical determination.  The trial court should not . . . 
make this determination.  As long as the evidence shows the intruder has not 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Johnson, 54 S.W.3d at 600. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 599. 
 90. Id. at 600–01. 
 91. Id. at 605 (“It is difficult to fault the trial judge for failing to instruct on this defense 
when no one else, including defense counsel, realized that the instruction should have been 
given.”). 
 92. Johnson, 54 S.W.3d at 601. 
 93. Id. (citing MO. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL 3D § 306.10, n.2 (1995)); see also 
MO. REV. STAT. § 556.051 (2000) (“When the phrase ‘The defendant shall have the burden of 
injecting the issue’ is used in the code, it means (1) The issue referred to is not submitted to the 
trier of fact unless supported by evidence; and (2) If the issue is submitted to the trier of fact any 
reasonable doubt on the issue requires a finding for the defendant on that issue.”). 
 94. Johnson, 54 S.W.3d at 601. 
 95. Id. at 602. 
 96. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] SHOOTING FROM THE HIP 867 
entered the dwelling, an instruction defining the defense of habitation must be 
given so the jury can focus on the immediacy of the danger of the entry rather 
than on the immediacy of the danger of the harm.97 
Based on the defendant’s testimony, the court found that he was trying to 
keep the two young men from entering his house, a clear signal for a defense 
of habitation instruction.98  Focusing on Ivicsics’s mandate that “[a]s long as 
the evidence shows the intruder has not entered the dwelling, an instruction 
defining the defense of habitation must be given,”99 rather than its reflection 
that at the doorway “either defense may suffice”100 the court found that, despite 
the extreme similarity between the two doctrines in this fact pattern, failure to 
give a defense of habitation instruction was reversible and prejudicial error.101  
The court made clear, therefore, that the two defenses were to be kept separate, 
despite their similarities, because of the distinct difference in the harm to be 
prevented.102 
In Wright v. State, the court made clear that there must be imminent danger 
of unlawful entry into the dwelling itself, not merely the curtilage.103  The 
defendant and the victim in this case had a strained relationship, and the victim 
had, earlier that day, challenged the defendant to a fight.104  While the 
defendant was at his girlfriend’s house, the victim came over and repeatedly 
banged on the door, renewing his challenge to fight.105  The defendant did not 
respond until the victim was walking back to his car, having already scaled the 
fence surrounding the property.106  When the defendant shouted for the victim 
to leave, even though he was no longer on the property, the victim turned and 
began to walk toward the defendant.107  Before he had even crossed the fence 
back into the yard, though, the defendant shot him three times.108  His body 
was found outside the fenced area.109 
The defendant argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance,110 in 
part because of a failure to request a defense of habitation instruction.111  The 
 
 97. Id. at 603 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1980)). 
 98. Id. at 604. 
 99. Johnson, 54 S.W.3d at 605 (quoting Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 778). 
 100. Id. at 603. 
 101. Id. at 605. 
 102. Id. at 603. 
 103. Wright v. State, 125 S.W.3d 861, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added).  The 
“curtilage” in Wright is the area around the home enclosed by a fence.  Id. 
 104. Id. at 865. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Wright, 125 S.W.3d at 865. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding that counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to request the instruction because no evidence presented 
at trial supported such an instruction.112  Distinguishing Johnson, the court 
believed no instruction on defense of habitation was necessary: “the victim in 
Johnson was shot while trying to gain direct entry into the defendant’s home, 
not while standing outside a fence surrounding the curtilage of the premises 
supposedly protected.”113  Thus, just as previous courts had set the internal 
boundaries of defense of habitation at the doorway, this court set the external 
boundaries, holding that force used to protect the curtilage, rather than the 
house proper, would not be protected by this defense.114 
The Missouri Supreme Court’s most recent opinion on defense of 
habitation came in State v. Avery, where it found in 2003 that the trial court’s 
failure to give a defense of habitation instruction was reversible error.115  The 
Supreme Court’s opinion did not change the law of defense of habitation in 
Missouri at all, nor did it address a new nuance of the law as it had in 
Johnson.116 Avery did, however, clearly and concisely summarize the state of 
the defense of habitation doctrine in Missouri prior to the statutory changes 
made in 2007, which created a significant departure from the case law up to 
that point.117 
The defendant lived in her boyfriend’s house, while having an affair with 
the victim, Mr. Paris.118  One evening, while her boyfriend was out of town, 
the defendant invited the victim back to her boyfriend’s house.119  However, 
after a call from her boyfriend, the defendant asked the victim to leave.120  
When he refused to leave, the defendant claimed that she became frightened 
 
 111. Id. at 868. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Wright, 125 S.W.3d at 868 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id.  In State v. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006), the court adopted 
this point even more explicitly by noting that, when defense of habitation is at issue, “‘premises’ 
is usually understood to constitute the house, or dwelling, and not broadly to include all of the 
defender’s property.” 
 115. State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Mo. 2003). 
 116. As discussed above, the nuance explored in Johnson was the merging of self defense and 
defense of habitation at the threshold of the dwelling.  State v. Johnson, 54 S.W.3d 598, 603 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 117. It also was a significant departure from previous statutory law regulating defense of 
habitation.  For a discussion on the statutory changes, see infra Part IV. 
 118. Avery, 120 S.W.3d at 198.  Note that the defendant in this case presumably did not 
actually have a property interest in the house since it was her boyfriend’s, not her own.  Id.  Still, 
the court concluded that she was entitled to the instruction because that is where she lived.  Id. at 
204.  Thus, it seems that even before the 2007 amendment, those who occupied the dwelling had 
a right to invoke the defense of habitation, even if they did not own or lease the dwelling. 
 119. Id. at 199. 
 120. Id. 
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and retrieved a gun from the bedroom.121  After seeing the weapon, the victim 
decided to leave.122  Shortly thereafter, the defendant took her dog for a 
walk.123  When she heard noises and saw someone approaching, the defendant 
ran back to her house in such haste that she forgot to shut the door behind 
her.124  The victim had returned, and, upon seeing the gun pointed at him while 
he was in the doorway, became angry and approached.125  While the facts are 
not entirely clear as to whether the victim had actually entered or not,126 the 
court believed that there were sufficient facts to give an instruction and allow 
the jury to decide.127 
The court began its analysis by acknowledging and reaffirming the case 
law that had already laid out the doctrine of defense of habitation as compared 
to self defense: 
In Missouri, defense of premises is essentially accelerated self-defense because 
it authorizes protective acts to be taken earlier than they otherwise would be 
authorized, that is, at the time when and place where the intruder is seeking to 
cross the protective barrier of the house.  Once the person enters the premises 
without resistance, the principles of self-defense apply.128 
This is the basic and oft-repeated distinction between normal defense of 
habitation and self defense prior to the 2007 amendments.129  The use of 
deadly force, as had been established by previous case law dating back to 
common law, could be used in defense of habitation “when a person 
reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what [s]he reasonably believes to 
be an attempt by the trespasser to commit arson or burglary upon h[er] 
dwelling.”130  Because the victim attempted to enter the defendant’s house for 
the purpose of assaulting her, the evidence supported a finding of burglary, 
therefore making the defendant’s actions fall within the scope of the defense of 
habitation doctrine.131  The court asserted that, where the facts presented 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Avery, 120 S.W.3d at 199. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. The defendant testified that he approached her and they struggled, but his body was 
found in the doorway suggesting that he had not yet crossed the threshold into the dwelling.  Id. at 
199, 204. 
 127. Id. at 204. 
 128. Avery, 120 S.W.3d at 204 (citation omitted). 
 129. See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 77 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Ivicsics, 604 
S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 130. Avery, 120 S.W.3d at 204 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 563.036.2(2) (2000)). 
 131. Id. 
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support a submission of both self defense and defense of habitation, both must 
be given.132 
While the case law did not change dramatically over the last century,133 
courts did address nuances providing clarity in the distinctions between self 
defense and defense of habitation.  As the court made clear in Ivicsics, the 
main difference between self defense and defense of habitation is “a function 
of time and space;”134 defense of habitation will only apply if the force, either 
deadly or non-lethal, is used prior to the intruder’s entry into the house 
proper.135  After the barrier is crossed, any kind of force used must be justified 
under the normal rules of self defense, except that there is no duty for the 
defender to retreat.136  This line drawn at the doorway of the house dividing the 
applicability of the two doctrines is due to the different harm to be protected 
against: danger of personal injury versus danger of entry.137  The jury must be 
given both instructions if the intruder has not crossed the barrier of the house 
because the focus is different.138 
Self defense and the defense of habitation can be asserted for both deadly 
and non-deadly force.139  The defender can use non-deadly force when he 
reasonably believes such force to be necessary to prevent the other party from 
committing trespass.140  Defense of habitation is only available following the 
use of deadly force when the defender had not only a reasonable fear of an 
imminent entry into his home, but also a reasonable belief that the intruder 
would commit some additional act, including the felonies of arson or burglary, 
upon entry.141  It is important to understand the clarity the courts sought in 
distinguishing self defense from defense of habitation and deadly force from 
non-lethal force, largely because the current statute has combined the two 
doctrines, muddying the doctrine’s previous perspicuity. 
 
 132. Id. at 204–05. 
 133. Compare State v. Taylor, 44 S.W. 785 (Mo. 1898), with Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196. 
 134. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 777. 
 135. Wright v. State, 125 S.W.3d 861, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Brookshire, 353 
S.W.2d 681, 692 (Mo. 1962). 
 136. Brookshire, 353 S.W.2d at 692. 
 137. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d at 776. 
 138. Id. at 778. 
 139. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.036 (2000). 
 140. Id. § 563.036.1. 
 141. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.036.2 (2000); State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Mo. 2003). 
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III.  STATUTORY REFORM 
A. Statutory History: 1977–2006 
Missouri’s defense of habitation142 and self-defense statutes have a 
common history in many ways, but the merging of the two doctrines in 2007 is 
somewhat surprising considering the significant differences in the doctrines 
and the court’s emphatic separation of the two.143  Prior to the 2007 
amendment combining the self defense and defense of habitation doctrines, the 
statutes provided for the defenses separately,144 which was, and remains, the 
common treatment of the doctrine.145  An examination of both, therefore, is 
necessary to understand the context of the 2007 and 2010 amendments. 
 
 142. The statute was actually titled “defense of premises,” but premises, habitation, and 
dwelling are used interchangeably by courts and have no unique meaning. 
 143. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Supp. 2007).  Remember, the courts thought that the 
doctrines were separate enough that failure to give one instruction when both were applicable was 
considered prejudicial. 
 144. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 563.031, 563.036 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 563.031, 563.036 
(1994); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 563.031, 563.036 (1986); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 563.031, 563.036 
(1978). 
 145. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.335, 11.81.350 (2010) (“Justification: Use of deadly force 
in defense of self” and “Justification: Use of force in defense of property and premises”); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-405, 13-407 (2010) (“Justification; use of deadly physical force” and 
“Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises”); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-607, 5-2-
608 (2010) (“Use of deadly physical force in defense of a person” and “Defense of premises 
justification”); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-704, 18-1-704.5, 18-1-705 (2010) (“Use of physical 
force in defense of a person,” “Use of deadly physical force against an intruder,” and “Use of 
physical force in defense of premises”); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-19, 53a-20 (2011) (“Use of 
physical force in defense of person” and “Use of physical force in defense of premises”); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 464, 469 (2007) (“Justification—Use of force in self-protection” and 
“Justification—Person unlawfully in dwelling”); FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012, 776.013 (2010) (“Use of 
force in defense of person” and “Home protection; use of deadly force; presumption of fear of 
death or great bodily harm”); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-21, 16-3-23 (2007) (“Use of force in 
defense of self or others; evidence of belief that force was necessary in murder or manslaughter 
prosecution” and “Use of force in defense of habitation”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1, 5/7-2 
(2008) (“Use of force in defense of person” and “Use of force in defense of dwelling”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3211, 21-3212, 21-3212a (2007) (“Use of force in defense of a person; no duty 
to retreat,” “Presumption of reasonable belief in necessity of use of force,” and “Use of force in 
defense of dwelling; no duty to retreat”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 503.050, 503.055 (LexisNexis 
2008) (“Use of physical force in self-protection; admissibility of evidence of prior acts of 
domestic violence and abuse” and “Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or 
occupied vehicle; exceptions”); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-102, 45-3-103 (2009) (“Use of force 
in defense of person” and “Use of force in defense of occupied structure”); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 
28-1409, 28-1411 (2008) (“Use of force in self-protection” and “Use of force for protection of 
property”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:4, 627:7 (Cum. Supp. 2010) (“Physical Force in 
Defense of a Person” and “Use of Force in Defense of Premises”); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2C:3-4, 
2C:3-6 (2010) (“Use of force in self-protection” and “Use of force in defense of premises or 
personal property”); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 35.15, 35.20 (McKinney 2009) (“Justification; use of 
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The statutes have a relatively intertwined history in their creation and 
revision.  Both statutes were created in 1977 by Senate Bill No. 60, which 
became effective in 1979.146  The section on self defense as a justification 
provided: 
1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2, use physical force 
upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be 
necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes 
to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by such other person, unless: 
 (1) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his use of force 
is nevertheless justifiable provided 
  (a) He has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively 
communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in 
continuing the incident by the use or threatened use of unlawful force; or 
  (b) He is a law enforcement officer and as such is an aggressor 
pursuant to section 563.046; or 
  (c) The aggressor is justified under some other provision of this chapter 
or other provision of law; 
 (2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the 
person whom he seeks to protect would not be justified in using such 
protective force. 
2. A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the 
circumstances specified in subsection 1 unless he reasonably believes that such 
deadly force is necessary to protect himself or another against death, serious 
physical injury, rape, sodomy or kidnapping. 
3. The justification afforded by this section extends to the use of physical 
restraint as protective force provided that the actor takes all reasonable 
measures to terminate the restraint as soon as it is reasonable to do so. 
4. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification 
under this section.147 
 
physical force in defense of a person” and “Justification; use of physical force in defense of 
premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary”); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-03, 
12.1-05-06, 12.1-05-07.1 (2011) (“Self-defense,” “Use of force in defense of premises and 
property,” and “Use of deadly force—Presumption of fear of death or serious bodily injury”); OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 161.209, 161.225 (2007) (“Use of physical force in defense of a person” and 
“Defense of Premises”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 505, 507 (1998) (“Use of force in self-
protection” and “Use of force for the protection of property”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-405 
(LexisNexis 1994) (“Force in defense of person – Forcible felony defined” and “Force in defense 
of habitation”).  But cf. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2008) (“Use of force to protect person or 
property”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-602 (2009) (“Use of force in self defense”). 
 146. S.B. 60, 79th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1977). 
 147. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Supp. 1977). 
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The section on defense of habitation stated: 
1. A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is licensed 
or privileged to be thereon, may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2, use 
physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes it necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be 
the commission or attempted commission of the crime of trespass by the other 
person. 
2. A person may use deadly force under circumstances described in 
subsection 1 above only 
 (1) When such use of deadly force is authorized under other sections of this 
chapter; or 
 (2) When he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably 
believes to be an attempt by the trespasser to commit arson or burglary upon 
his dwelling. 
3. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification 
under this section.148 
In 1993, both statutes were amended, again, by the same bill, Senate Bill 
No. 180.149  The only substantive changes made to the self-defense statute, 
section 563.031, was the addition under subsection 2 allowing deadly force to 
be used to protect against serious physical injury through robbery, burglary, or 
arson if all the other conditions were met.150 
The bill made, arguably, more significant changes to the defense of 
habitation section.  As the bill had widened the permissible use of deadly force 
under the self-defense section, it also, nominally at least, increased a 
homeowner’s right to use deadly force in defense of habitation.151  The bill 
added a third subdivision to subsection 2 that allowed deadly force to be used, 
provided all other elements were met, 
 
 148. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.036 (Supp. 1977).  Note that although the wording of allowing 
force to prevent or terminate suggests that force could be used against one who had already 
crossed the threshold, the courts did not so interpret the language and continued to enforce the 
doctrine only up to the point where the threshold into the house was crossed.  State v. Avery, 120 
S.W.3d 196, 204 (Mo. 2003) (“In Missouri, defense of premises is essentially accelerated self-
defense because it authorizes protective acts to be taken earlier than they otherwise would be 
authorized, that is, at the time when and place where the intruder is seeking to cross the protective 
barrier of the house.  Once the person enters the premises without resistance, the principles of 
self-defense apply.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. S.B. 180, 87th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1993). 
 150. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Supp. 1993).  The amendment also added the phrase “of this 
section” and “force” for clarity, but such additions did not change the substance of the section.  
Id. 
 151. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.036 (Supp. 1993) (setting forth the permissible use of 
physical force in defense of premises). 
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when entry into the premises is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry 
is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering physical violence 
to any person or being in the premises and he reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of a felony.152 
While this section appears to add another situation in which deadly force may 
be used, upon consideration of the burglary statutes in place, it is unclear when 
this section would be necessary as opposed to subdivision 2 of subsection 2.  
For, under that section, a homeowner was allowed to use deadly force when he 
reasonably believed that the trespasser was going to commit burglary.153 
According to the burglary statute in place when the 1993 amendment was 
passed, first-degree burglary occurred when: 
A person . . . knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in 
a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime 
therein, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or inhabitable 
structure or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the 
crime: (1) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or; (2) Causes or 
threatens immediate physical injury to any person who is not a participant in 
the crime; or (3) There is present in the structure another person who is not a 
participant in the crime.154 
Also, second-degree burglary was committed when a person “knowingly enters 
unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable 
structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein.”155  So, first-degree 
burglary would occur, and thus, subdivision 2 would apply, if a trespasser 
entered the house, in any manner, as long as it was unlawful, with the intent to 
commit a crime, while someone was at home.156  It is hard then, to conceive of 
a situation where subdivision 3 would apply, but subdivision 2 would not. 
As the case law consistently reflected, a person who uses physical force 
under the defense of premises section must have an objectively reasonable 
belief that the intruder intends to trespass on his premises,157 which as cases 
noted, only included the house proper.158  Moreover, again in line with 
common law and reflected in the cases,159 a person may use deadly force only 
when protecting himself, his home, or other occupants against arson, burglary, 
or an assault.160  It is extremely important to note the interrelation between 
 
 152. Id. (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. § 563.036.2(2). 
 154. MO. REV. STAT. § 569.160.1 (1994). 
 155. Id. § 569.170.1. 
 156. See id. §§ 569.160, 563.036.2(2), 563.036.2(3). 
 157. See id. § 563.036.1. 
 158. See supra Part II. 
 159. See supra Parts I–II. 
 160. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 563.036.2–563.036.3 (1994). 
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subsections 1 and 2: subsection 2 explicitly requires that not only must the 
elements of subsection 2 be met in order to use deadly force, but the 
requirements of subsection 1 must be met as well.161  Thus, by incorporating 
subsection 1 into the deadly force section, the legislature continued to require 
that the defender have reasonable belief of the imminent danger of unlawful 
entry and trespass as well as a reasonable belief that the trespasser will commit 
arson, burglary, or assault and that deadly force is necessary for prevention.162  
So, up to this point, the statutes in place reflected the case law history defining 
the boundaries of defense of habitation in Missouri. 
B. Statutory History: 2007–2009 
In 2007, after an intertwined but still distinct history, defense of habitation 
and self defense officially merged into one statute.163  Senate Bills 62 and 41 
repealed section 563.036 and created a new defense of habitation provision 
within the pre-existing self-defense statute:164 
1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of this section, use 
physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she 
reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a 
third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent 
use of unlawful force by such other person, unless: 
 (1) The actor was the initial aggressor; 
 . . . 
2. A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the 
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless: 
 (1) He or she reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to protect 
himself or herself or another against death, serious physical injury, or any 
forcible felony; or 
 (2) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after 
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle lawfully occupied by such person. 
3. A person does not have a duty to retreat from a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle where the person is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining. 
. . . 
 
 161. See id. § 563.036.2 (“A person may use deadly force under circumstances described in 
subsection 1 above only [when]”) (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. 
 163. S.B. 62 & 41, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007). 
 164. Id. 
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5. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification 
under this section.165 
Clearly, gone is the distinction between defense of habitation and self 
defense that the former can only be invoked prior to the invader’s entry of the 
home.166  With the addition of “unlawfully remaining,” defense of habitation 
can be invoked even when the intruder has crossed the threshold into the 
house.167  Now, when force is used in the home and the victim had no lawful 
right to be there, the defendant is entitled to an instruction of defense of 
habitation in all cases.168  The distinction made in the cases about a difference 
in time and space is no more. 
Not only was the doctrine extended to include invasions of the house 
already completed, but also it was broadened as to the places in which it may 
be used.  Instead of being limited to use of force in protection of the house 
proper, a person can use deadly force when someone unlawfully enters or 
remains in his “dwelling, residence, or vehicle.”169  As the definitions indicate, 
the place protected need not be permanent and the defender need not have a 
property interest in the dwelling—even a guest may use deadly force against 
an intruder.170 
A further possible result of the amendment may be the destruction of the 
requirements of reasonable belief, necessity, and imminent harm.  Because 
such a conclusion is debatable, both conclusion and counter-argument will be 
analyzed. 
Consider, first, the changes from section 563.036.2 to 563.031.2.  Worthy 
of note is the change of the logical terms used, which connect subsections 1 
and 2.  In the previously separate defense of habitation section, the connection 
read “[a] person may use deadly force under circumstances described in 
subsection 1 above only [when] . . .”171 indicating that the requirements of 
subsection 1 must be present in addition to those listed in subsection 2; 
however, the new statute says “[a] person may not use deadly force upon 
 
 165. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Supp. 2007). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. § 563.031.2(2). 
 168. See MO. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL 3D § 306.11 (2011). 
 169. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2(2) (Supp. 2007).  According to MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
563.011(2)–563.011(3) (Supp. 2007), a dwelling is “any building, inhabitable structure, or 
conveyance of any kind, whether the building, inhabitable structure, or conveyance is temporary 
or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to 
be occupied by people lodging therein at night,” and a residence is “a dwelling in which a person 
resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.” 
 170. Id.  The inclusion of “vehicle” in this section was presumably to protect against 
carjackings. 
 171. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.036 (1994). 
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another person under the circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section 
unless . . .”172 making the relation between the two subsections less clear. 
With the wording in place following the 2007 amendment, an argument 
could well be made that the section regulating deadly force in defense of 
habitation does not incorporate the first section.  “Unless” can be a tricky word 
in terms of logical meaning, but the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as 
“except if”173 and Merriam-Webster defines it as “except on the condition that” 
or “under any other circumstance than.”174 Thus, the phrasing suggests that 
“[a] person may not use deadly force upon another person under the 
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section” except on the condition 
that the requirements of a subdivision of subsection 2 are met;175 that is, a 
person may not use deadly force, even under the circumstances specified in 
subsection 1 except on the condition that he falls into one of the subdivisions 
specified.  Since subdivision 2 does not itself reincorporate the requirements 
set forth in subsection 1, there appears a defensible theory that subsection 1 
simply does not apply to that subdivision.176 
If such a reading were true, subsection 2, delimiting the use of deadly 
force, would not explicitly incorporate subsection 1’s requirements of 
reasonable belief, necessity, and imminent harm.177  This conclusion results in 
an extreme exemption to the prohibition of using deadly force.  No longer 
would a person need to have reasonable belief that there is an imminent threat 
of harm—if a person with no right to be there enters another’s house, the 
homeowner can use deadly force, even if the invader poses no real threat!  
Furthermore, upon examining the chapter definitions, one finds that unlawful 
entry does not require any felonious intent or forceful entry; it is merely when 
“a person . . . enters such premises and is not licensed or privileged to do so.” 
178  Assuming arguendo that section 1 is not incorporated because of the 
changes previously discussed, the legislature, in essence, diverged from the 
common law and case law principle that deadly force could not be used against 
a mere trespasser.179 
Of course, an equally strong counter argument to this reading of the 2007 
statutory amendments is also possible.  While a consideration of only the 
previous defense of premises statute would lead more strongly to the 
 
 172. Id. § 563.031 (Supp. 2007). 
 173. 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 100 (2d ed. 1989). 
 174. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 2503 (Philip B. Gove et al. eds., 2002). 
 175. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Supp. 2007). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. § 563.011(8). 
 179. See State v. Taylor, 44 S.W. 785, 789 (Mo. 1898). 
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conclusion that subsection 1 should not be incorporated,180 when it is read in 
conjunction with the history of self defense and the courts’ interpretation of the 
statute, the conclusion that subsection 1 should be incorporated is stronger.  
For example, in State v. Chambers, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that 
“[d]eadly force may be used in self-defense only when there is . . . an absence 
of aggression or provocation on the part of the defender . . . .”181  Thus, the 
Missouri Supreme Court has read into the self-defense statute that subsection 1 
is, in fact, incorporated into subsection 2.182  Therefore, the addition of a 
subdivision would not change the applicability of subsection 1 to subsection 2. 
Although Missouri courts have not dealt with the new statute in any cases 
yet, the new Model Jury Instruction, accounting for both the 2007 and 2010 
amendments, indicates that the court will likely incorporate the requirements of 
subsection 1 for defense of habitation situations.183  The instruction itself does 
not mention an initial aggressor requirement, suggesting that subsection 1 
should not be incorporated, but the Notes on Use section explains that the 
requirement for an unlawful entering or remaining means it would be rare that 
the defender would be an initial aggressor.184  Because it appears from the 
notes that there is an initial aggressor element, despite it not being mentioned 
in the text of the jury instruction itself, it is probably safe, but not certain, to 
predict that courts will read subsection 1 into subsection 2. 
Note, though, that even if this latter interpretation is true, there is still an 
extreme divergence from the proportionality element that has been present up 
to this point.  In traditional self defense, a person can only use deadly force 
when the attacker threatens him with death, serious physical injury, or a 
 
 180. The change in wording from the 1994 version of “a person may use . . . only” to the 2007 
defense of premises version of “a person may not use . . . unless,” should, according to the 
statutory construction rule that a change is ordinarily intended to have some effect, be given some 
effect.  The only effect that it can be given, since the legislature clearly knew how to 
unambiguously incorporate a previous subsection into a latter one as they did in MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 563.036, is that the new version was not meant to incorporate the requirements of subsection 1. 
 181. State v. Chambers, 671 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. 1984).  Chambers is still good law as, 
other than the 1993 addition of certain felonies justifying deadly force, the language has not been 
changed.  Thus, its applicability remains. 
 182. Id. 
 183. MO. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL 3D § 306.11 (2011). 
 184. Id. (“Section 563.031(1), provides that self-defense by occupiers of dwellings, 
residences and vehicles and self-defense under MAI-CR 3d 306.06A will, subject to some 
exceptions, be denied to a person who is an initial aggressor.  It will be rare for this issue to arise 
under this instruction.  A person lawfully occupying a dwelling, residence or vehicle can only be 
an initial aggressor if he uses force against a person who is not attempting to enter unlawfully, has 
not unlawfully entered, or has not remained after unlawfully entering the dwelling, residence or 
vehicle.  Should such a situation arise, this instruction must be modified to include the issue of 
initial aggressor.”). 
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forcible felony.185  If the attacker only threatens “unlawful force,” deadly force 
is not justified.186  Now, however, simple unlawful force will justify a response 
of deadly force if the person using unlawful force is also trespassing.187  Thus, 
even if the courts ultimately interpret subsection 2 as incorporating subsection 
1, there has still been a distinct move away from the proportionality demanded 
in the past. 
C. Statutory History: 2010 
The statutory overhaul of the defense of habitation doctrine did not end in 
2007.  In 2010, House Bill 1692 was passed broadening, limiting, and arguably 
complicating the doctrine.188  The extension came through the addition of 
subdivision 3 to subsection 2, which allows deadly force when “[s]uch force is 
used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after unlawfully 
entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is owned or 
leased by an individual claiming a justification of using protective force under 
this section.”189  As “private property” includes “any real property in this state 
that is privately owned or leased,”190 this amendment effectively extends 
defense of habitation to a homeowner’s property line.  Where courts had 
previously refused to extend defense of habitation to include the “curtilage,” 
the legislature boldly pushed far beyond. 
However, some restrictions were put in place in the 2010 amendments as 
well.  Amending subsection 5, which provides that the defendant has the 
burden of injecting the issue of justification,191 the legislature made the 
following a rebuttable presumption that the state must overcome: 
If a defendant asserts that his or her use of force is described under subdivision 
(2) of subsection 2 of this section, the burden shall then be on the state to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably believe that 
the use of such force was necessary to defend against what he or she 
reasonably believed was the use or imminent use of unlawful force.192 
 
 185. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2(1) (Supp. 2007). 
 186. Id. § 563.031.1. 
 187. Id. § 563.031. 
 188. H.B. 1692, 1209, 1405, 1499, 1535, & 1811, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2010). 
 189. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2(3) (Supp. 2010). 
 190. Id. § 563.011(6). 
 191. Remember, this is a low burden: the defendant need not even request the defense; if facts 
are presented that support an instruction of defense of premises, the court is required to give one. 
 192. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.5 (Supp. 2010). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
880 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:857 
In creating this rebuttable presumption, the legislature effectively incorporated 
subsection 1193 into subdivision 2, but shifted the burden to the state to prove 
that the elements were not present. 
Despite the superficially straightforward and reasonable appearance of the 
new rebuttable presumption, upon closer examination, there seem to be some 
ambiguities and discrepancies.  First, it is worthy of note that nowhere in the 
Missouri Revised Statutes is “unlawful force” defined.  Presumably, it includes 
any and all force against both person and property that is not authorized in 
some other section.194  Since it is not limited to force against a person, force 
used to enter a dwelling (such as breaking a window) would be sufficient—and 
remember, such force need not actually be used, there simply must be a 
reasonable belief in the imminent use of such force.195  Even if some force 
were used, this section would allow deadly force to be used against a non-
deadly threat.  Notice that deadly force is not allowed in subdivision 1 of 
subsection 2 unless the force defended against is that which could cause death, 
serious physical injury, or any forcible felony.196  A simple change of location, 
therefore, greatly modifies the amount of force that is allowed. 
The second discrepancy of subsection 5 is that it fails to mention 
subdivision 3 at all.  Although subsection 5 creates a rebuttable presumption 
for subdivision 2, limiting the use of deadly force in defense of one’s dwelling, 
residence, or vehicle, it completely fails to mention subdivision 3, which 
extended the doctrine to all private property.  It is unclear, therefore, what the 
restrictions are for subdivision 3, who bears the burden, and what that burden 
is. 
There are three possibilities on how to read the interaction between 
subdivision 3 and subsection 5, depending on whether subsection 1 is going to 
be read into subsection 2 by the courts: (1) the legislature intentionally left 
subdivision 3 out and subsection 1 is read into subsection 2, requiring the court 
to make a nearly impossible distinction and resulting in extremely different 
burdens; (2) the legislature intentionally left it out and subsection 1 is not 
incorporated into subsection 2, making it harder to defend your home than your 
backyard; or (3) the legislature made a mistake and forgot to include 
 
 193. Note, however, not all elements of subsection 1 were included: the requirement that the 
defendant not be the initial aggressor is not included.  See id. § 563.031.2(3). 
 194. The Model Penal Code defines unlawful force as “force, including confinement, that is 
employed without the consent of the person against whom it is directed and the employment of 
which constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such offense or tort except for 
a defense (such as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity; duress; youth; or 
diplomatic status) not amounting to a privilege to use the force.  Assent constitutes consent, 
within the meaning of this Section, whether or not it otherwise is legally effective, except assent 
to the infliction of death or serious bodily injury.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11 (1980). 
 195. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.1 (Supp. 2010). 
 196. Id. § 563.031.2(1). 
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subdivision 3 in the rebuttable presumption.  The third possibility seems the 
most likely—the legislature simply made a mistake. 
First, assuming that subsection 2 incorporates the requirements of 
subsection 1, the legislature could have intentionally left out subdivision 3 
from the rebuttable presumption so that a defendant using deadly force in 
protection of private property, not habitation, would have a higher burden.  For 
if subsection 1 was already read into subsection 2, the rebuttable presumption 
would solely be lowering the burden for a person defending his or her 
habitation by shifting the burden of proof to the state.197  The legislature may 
reasonably have been hesitant to extend that burden-shifting to someone who is 
only defending his private property rather than his home.  Superficially this 
makes sense, but practically it would be extremely difficult for a court to 
decide which subdivision applies.  After all, the court would have to determine 
whether the invader on another’s private property was “unlawfully remaining” 
on the private property, or whether he was “attempting to unlawfully enter” the 
house proper.  Add on to that inquiry the defender’s “reasonable belief” of 
what he or she thought the invader’s intent was and the issue would become 
extremely messy.  With such a disparate burden, it is doubtful that the 
legislature actually intended such an indeterminate distinction to be made. 
On the other hand, if subsection 1 is not incorporated into subsection 2, 
there is an even less likely result: subsection 5 would make it harder to protect 
a person’s home than their yard.  The rebuttable presumption would not only 
be shifting the burden, but also introducing new criteria, requiring, namely, 
that the homeowner’s use of deadly force was reasonable and necessary.198  
However, if that is the case, the homeowner would have to show that his force 
was reasonable and necessary in defending his house proper but would not 
have to prove those elements if he were defending his curtilage or private 
property.  Neither of these two results seems very likely. 
Therefore, the most probable conclusion is that the legislature simply 
forgot to include subdivision 3 in the revision of subsection 5.  A revision 
would make the burden the same for both subdivisions 2 and 3 and negate the 
need to make an odd and probably futile distinction between the two 
subdivisions. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Moving from a clear and consistent common law and case law standard, 
the amendments in 2007 and 2010 seem to have complicated the issue more 
than anything else.  With burdens shifted for some but not all subdivisions, and 
subsections only possibly incorporating the restrictions of the other, 
 
 197. See id. § 563.031. 
 198. See id. 
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clarification, and probably revisions, are needed—especially when deadly 
force is involved.  Putting aside political opinions about whether expanding the 
allowable use of deadly force in defense of habitation is desirable, it is 
indisputable that at the very least the doctrine needs to be clear.  Unfortunately, 
in an aim to provide greater protection to people at home, Missouri lawmakers 
instead have left their constituents less sure of what action they can legally take 
to defend their castles. 
SARAH A. POHLMAN* 
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APPENDIX 
Following the legislature’s lead, this author will suggest one more 
amendment to, hopefully, resolve the uncertainties of Missouri’s new defense 
of habitation statute.  As many of the clarity issues arise because of the merger 
of two doctrines—intended by Missouri courts to be separate doctrines as 
evidenced by case law199 and current model jury instructions200—the proposed 
revision would return the self-defense statute back to its 2006 language, and 
provide a new defense of habitation statute as follows: 
1. A person may use deadly force upon another person only when he or she 
reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a 
third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent 
use of unlawful force by such other person and: 
 (1) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after 
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle lawfully occupied by such person; or 
 (2) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after 
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is 
owned or leased by an individual claiming a justification of using protective 
force under this section. 
2. A person does not have a duty to retreat from a dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle where the person is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining.  
A person does not have a duty to retreat from private property that is owned or 
leased by such individual. 
3. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification 
under this section.  Upon successfully injecting the issue of justification, the 
burden shall then be on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not reasonably believe that the use of such force was necessary 
to defend against what he or she reasonably believed was the use or imminent 
use of unlawful force. 
  
 
 199. See State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 776–78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing the 
distinctions between the self defense and defense of habitation). 
 200. See MO. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL 3D § 306.11 (2011) (Justification: Self-
Defense in Dwellings and Vehicles); MO. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL 3D § 306.06A 
(Justification: Use of Force in Self-Defense); MO. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL 3D § 
306.07A (Justification: Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense-Battered Spouse) (providing 
separate instructions for normal self defense and force used in defense of habitation). 
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